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EDITOR HAL BERGHEL
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The Equifax Hack
Revisited and
Repurposed
Hal Berghel, University of Nevada, Las Vegas
There has never been any serious dispute over the nature of the Equifax
hack and not much dispute over the
perpetrators. Bloomberg Businessweek
speculated shortly after the hack was
announced in 2017 that it was likely
state sponsored,1 and the Daily Mail
expanded the speculation by accusing
China the next day.2 Although Barr
gives the impression that the China connection was discovered only through a no-stone-unturned crackerjack
investigation by his office, in fact, his office’s announcement was three years late to the party. The announcement
is a rather pedestrian attempt to keep the story alive for
reasons that have nothing to do with the crime or injury to victims.
What we know for certain is that Barr and the DoJ decided to actually prosecute four members of the Chinese
People’s Liberation Army.3 Of course, the likelihood that
these individuals will be arrested, much less prosecuted
and convicted, is about as likely as Donald Trump willingly
providing his tax returns to the Washington Post. Good
luck on serving those arrest warrants. As I’ve written before in this column, state-sponsored hacks are not uncommon these days. But as Andy Greenberg has noted, such
pointless prosecutions may lead to a tit-for-tat retaliation

The recent indictments against Chinese hackers
should be seen as political theater. Once again,
the Equifax hack rears its ugly head—but this
time for a political purpose.

O

n 10 February 2020, U.S. Attorney General
William Barr announced the indictment of
four Chinese military personnel for hacking
into the Equifax servers in 2017 (https://www
.youtube.com/watch?v=IpEuUzMPpxI). To the uninitiated,
the presentation may impart minimal confidence in the
U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ), but to nonpartisan security specialists, it will be seen as a purposeless effort to draw
attention away from other topics, such as the real problems
underscored by the Equifax hack and the recent questionable behavior by the DoJ. Barr’s anticlimactic faux prosecution announcement is taken from the pages of Aldous
Huxley and George Orwell. It falls under the rubric of what
I call juridical superfluity. Allow me to explain why I say this.
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by those targeted.4 Hopefully, savvy
journalists and the public will come
to understand Barr’s Sinophobic rant
for the political hokum that it is. However, Barr is the attorney general, so
his announcement deser ves some
careful analysis.
The actual indictment5 is historically, if not judicially, interesting. It
reports that “on or about 13 2018 May
and continuing through on or about 30
July 2017 members of the People’s Liberation Army … conspired with each
other to hack into the protected computers of Equifax … to steal sensitive
personally identifiable information of
145 million Americans.” The hack took
place through the unpatched Apache
Struts Server maintained by Equifax.
Although the patch for this vulnerability was announced on 7 March
2017,6 the Equifax IT security team,
led by a chief information security
officer (CISO) with a background in
music composition,10,11 didn’t bother
to apply it. In fact, Equifax didn’t even
announce the hack to the public until
early September, six weeks after the
incident.8 The fact that hackers accessed the personally identifiable information (PII) of half the U.S. population through a known, yet unpatched,
security vulnerability falls under the
rubric of what I label corporate faithbased security.9
No purposeless indictment would
be complete without primitive visual
aids, and this one does not disappoint.
Photos of three of the four accused
in military uniforms are appended.
One may only assume that the gratuitous addition of photos to an indictment is intended to provide a dash
of extra credibility to an otherwise
feckless, but formal, legal document.
Does anyone expect the photos to be
prominently displayed on kiosks in
theme parks and post offices coast to
coast? Photos attached to indictments
relating to national security offers
a new step into future prosecutorial
propaganda. I, for one, just can’t wait
until the DoJ starts making national
security indictments a staple on YouTube,
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the online equivalent of Judge Judy for
the national security complex. By way
of comparison, one might look to the
indictment of the 12 Russian intelligence officers for interfering with
the 2016 U.S. presidential election,12
no gratuitous media to be found anywhere therein. Could it be that Barr’s
DoJ has an entirely different agenda in
the Chinese Equifax case?
Well wonder no more because it
becomes clear in Section 5.b. of the indictment. We are informed that Equifax has taken “reasonable measures
to keep [their trade secrets] secret … ”
from others who might seek to exploit
their economic value. Just what were
these reasonable measures? To answer
that, we need to turn to the U.S. Senate
report of the incident, which came out
in early 2019.13
The Senate consensus follows immediately from the title of the Senate
report “How Equifax Neglected Cybersecurity and Suffered a Devastating Data Breach.” We note the difference between the tone of the Senate
report and Barr’s indictment. What
Barr considers “reasonable measures”
was deemed “neglected cybersecurity”
by the Senate. But it gets worse for
Equifax and the indictment hokum as
one digs into the report. According to
the report,
›› Equifax learned of significant
cybersecurity deficiencies in
2015, two years before the alleged
Chinese hack. “[A] 2015 security
audit identified more than 8,500
vulnerabilities that Equifax
employees failed to address for
more than 90 days beyond the
recommended patching timeframe,” 1,000 of which were rated
as critical, high, or medium.
›› Equifax lacked a comprehensive
IT asset inventory; specifically,
it didn’t know whether it was using the Apache Struts software
so it wasn’t aware of the need
to patch it.
›› Equifax used what internal
auditors called an honor system

››

››

››

››

››

for patching vulnerabilities, that
is, it had no formal method for
validating the successful installation of patches.
Equi fa x d id not employ
fol low-up aud it s a f ter t he
2015 one to deter m i ne
whether the v ulnerabilities
rema i ned.
The CISO did not regularly
attend the “global threats and
vulnerability management”
meetings where security vulnerabilities (like Apache Struts)
were discussed, and Equifax had
no policy regarding mandatory
attendance.
Equifax networked systems
were not isolated. The hackers
entered the IT infrastructure
through Equifax’s Online Dispute Portal and through that
accessed other sensitive and
unencrypted databases.
Equifax failed to adequately
enforce SSL certificate management policies.
Equifax’s records retention policy did not include all relevant
incident response records, as
they used instant messaging as
their primary communication
medium, and these communications were considered ephemeral and not retained.

This is just a partial list of Equifax’s
security deficiencies, but based on
Barr’s announcement, they qualify as
“reasonable measures” to protect sensitive data. We won’t even mention that
Equifax had no formal policy on the
disclosure of compromised customer
information—it waited six weeks to
make the public announcement that
they had been hacked. Careful reading
of the Senate report suggests that the
Equifax hack was less of a hack than an
illegal intrusion. What Equifax did was
create an attractive cybernuisance.
Of course, the Equifax postmortem
shows that the staff, for the most part,
assumed a cover-your-assets (CYA)
stance. To paraphrase, no one could
W W W.CO M P U T E R .O R G /CO M P U T E R

have prevented this, as it was the most
sophisticated cyberattack imaginable and totally indefensible—yadda,
yadda, yadda. Such claims are typical of embarrassed organizations and
should be taken with the proverbial
pinch of salt. Equifax didn’t know what
assets it had nor what was needed
to protect them; the CISO didn’t attend the vulnerability management
meetings; disparate components of
the networked infrastructure weren’t
properly isolated; it didn’t bother to
implement certificate management
policies; inadequate attention was paid
to egress traffic and the customer data
wasn’t adequately encrypted—then
the Chinese stole it. Who could’ve seen
that coming, according to Barr. As I’ve
mentioned before,14 in many ways,
these CYA tactics and lame excuses
resemble Elisabeth Kubler-Ross’s five
stages of grief. Equifax had a proven
track record of ineptitude when it came
to IT security controls and the protection of the data it held. Equifax security policy—and I use this term reluctantly—is analogous to locking your
doors but leaving a few windows open.
From an IT security point of view, none
of this qualifies as a reasonable measure to protect sensitive data.
Ultimately, the standard barometer
for determining the adequacy of security systems is whether they conform
to industry best practices. There is no
silver bullet to be found. If all of the
competition adopts the same or similar information security policy, at least
your organization can’t be singled out
as the lone incompetent player. As
it turns out, the Senate report deals
with this aspect as well by comparing Equifax’s security practices, especially patch policies, with those of
TransUnion and Experian, Equifax’s
closest business competitors. It should
come as no surprise that Equifax suffers for the comparison in many ways
and at most levels, specifically including ameliorating the Apache Struts
vulnerability. It’s all to be found in the
Senate report and postmortems by security specialists.15

THE REST OF THE STORY

The Senate findings make the DoJ’s
indictment all the more curious.
Without belaboring the point, a thorough understanding of the Equifax
hack naturally suggests the following
questions:
›› Why does the indictment’s
analysis of the hack downplay
Equifax’s culpability? The
indictment seems to suggest
that the four accused were
supergeeks who blazed a path
to as-yet-unimagined hacker
triumphs. But the evidence
shows that they were primarily
exploiting a known vulnerability that one of the credit-reporting companies (namely,
Equifax) simply chose to ignore.
The facts suggest that far from
cutting-edge cyberaggression,
the Equifax hack was more of an
exercise in Hacking 101.
›› Given the Senate report (and
other responsible accounts
from the technical press16–20),
how could Barr and the DoJ
expect their defense of Equifax’s
cybersecurity practices to be
taken seriously? If industry best
practices are to be our guide,
there was nothing reasonable
about it—amateurish seems to
be a better fit. The wording in
the indictment suggests that
the purpose of the indictment is
more theatrical than legal.
›› Why is the emphasis in the
indictment on the harm done to
Equifax (and their world-class
business practices) rather than
that done to Equifax’s innocent
customers whose compromised PII will doubtless lead to
decades of future identity theft
problems?
›› What accounts for the timing
of this seemingly senseless indictment? Temporally, we know
that Barr’s press release was
the day before he overturned
his prosecutor’s sentencing

recommendation for Roger
Stone and a few days before
President Trump went on his
latest pardon spree that included
Michael Milken, Bernard Kerik,
and Rod Blagojevich. The coincidence cannot be overlooked. If
the indictment were intuitively
justified and made a lot of legal
sense, one might be tempted
to ignore the coincidence. But
in this case, especially given
the history of the principals
involved, the indictment doesn’t
pass my smell test. The possibility of a sleight-of-hand move to
distract public attention from
attendant thorny political issues
seems a likely possibility.
›› Finally, one has to ask of all the
bad actors: Which are the most
dangerous to the United States
and its citizens? Foreign hackers
or incompetent corporations
who fail to respect the privacy
and PII of their customers’
data? There is no question that
Equifax has not proven itself to
be a responsible steward of the
public’s PII. The total penalty to
date, even if we take the higher
figure, will serve as no deterrent
to future irresponsible
corporate behavior. Quite the
contrary, it provides just one
more moral hazard.
I encourage digital security specialists and investigators to repeat my
analysis and derive their own conclusions. Incidentally, irresponsible behavior is not limited to Equifax’s chief
information officer and CISO. According to an indictment by the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of Georgia, 21 after becoming aware
of the hack, Sudhakar Bonthu, former Equifax production development
manager of software engineering in
Equifax’ global consumer ser vices
division, bought US$2,166 worth of
out-of-the-money put option contracts
for shares of Equifax common stock
on 1 September 2017 in anticipation
M AY 2 0 2 0 
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of Equifax’s disclosure of the breach.
The common stock dropped 14% on 8
September 2017, the day following the
announcement, whereupon Bonthu
exercised his options, profiting by
US$75,168—a return of 3,500% in six
days for his 86 put options. Because
Bonthu’s trading was based on material nonpublic information entrusted
to him by Equifax, the U.S. District
Court demanded that he forfeit the
money with interest, pay a fine of
US$50,000, and serve eight months of
home confinement.22
Equally interesting to me is that
two days after the intrusion was discovered by Equifax, the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission’s records
confirmed that three Equifax executives (the chief financial officer, workforce solutions president, and U.S.
information solutions president) sold
approximately US$2 million in Equifax stock from their portfolios.23,24 Coincidence? To top that, Rick Smith, the
chief executive officer of Equifax at
the time of the hack, was subsequently
given a US$90 million retirement
package.25 This is the stuff of which
dime store novels on crony capitalism
are made. There is definitely a Quentin
Tarantino movie in this somewhere. I
propose the following modest titles:
Data Dogs or Once Upon a Time with
Identity Theft.
So, what was the ultimate cost to
Equifax? The actual settlement was
somewhere between US$700 million
and US$1.4 billion, depending on how
and what you count.26,27 However,
by all accounts, the amount available for victim reparations is US$425
million,28 and approximately US$80
million is provided for attorney’s fees,
with some additional amounts for
fines and penalties (https://www.you
tube.com/watch?v=9GZQ1Nh_Rj8).
That’s right, US$3 per victim for reparations! The paltry amount allocated
to victim indemnification guarantees
that, on average, the victims’ financial
damage will remain uncompensated.
But what is worse is that there is an
onerous requirement that victims
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“prove up” any claimed losses. Proving up requires not only that the victims document damage but that they
also prove that the damage directly
resulted from the Equifax incident
and cannot have been the result of
any other incident or action—an impossible challenge for any individual
not currently a member of the country club set. Not surprisingly, I have a
suggestion. Because Barr is already in
“gratuitous prosecution” mode, I think
it only reasonable that he should sue
the Chinese government for US$150
trillion for victim reparations (that’s
US$100,000 per victim that, in my
opinion, is far more realistic than the
US$3 that the Federal Trade Commission seeks from Equifax). Of course,
that suit would go nowhere either,
but it might provide the victims with
more consolation than the futile prosecutions of four Chinese soldiers. If
nothing else is accomplished, it offers
better judicial theatrics.

O

ne final thought on how the
world might move forward
purposefully from the Equifax experience. The Council of Europe
adopted its Convention on Cybercrime
(also known as the Budapest Convention) in 2001.29 This convention, and
its 2006 extension, mandates that
signator y countries pass laws that
recognize and prosecute cybercrimes,
broadly defined. Specifically, enumerated crimes include the illegal access
to and use of computing systems and
networks, computer-related fraud, violations of copyright, offenses involving child pornography, hate crimes,
the distribution of racist material, and
so on. As of 3 February 2020, most of
the members of the Council of Europe
(except Russia) have signed the Budapest Convention, and only Sweden
and Ireland have failed to ratify. The
United States and its non-European
allies have mostly ratified as well (notable exceptions include Mexico, Brazil, China, and India).30 In 2019, the
United Nations (UN) began debate of a

similar treaty initiated by Russia that
included contributions from China,
Australia, Canada, Cuba, the United
Kingdom, Japan, and several other allies.31 I’m sure you can see where this
is headed. Because the initiative was
inspired by Russia and China, western
corporatists and American exceptionalists are unenthusiastic.
The issue is national sovereignty
and corporate interests. The U.S. position has always been strongly myopic,
defending against any international
judicial effort that might undermine
inviolability of U.S. interests. The
United States also took this stance 10
years ago when it opposed a similar
U.N. treaty on cybercrime.32 What the
United States does not want is any international policy that interferes with
existing U.S. monopolies in cyberspace and high tech, injects itself into
any future tech space that the United
States has carved out for itself, extends
international investigatory reach into
protected corporate space, undercuts
the evidentiary standards currently
applied by U.S. courts, and so on. This
posture is a consequence of the same
American exceptionalism that led to
the refusal of the United States to support the International Criminal Court
and prompted the 2002 passage of the
Hague Invasion Act. The U.S. demand
that it be immune to accountability
suggests that a more accurate term
might be American exemptionalism. As
long as such nationalistic attitudes
prevail, it will be difficult to get all
prospective international criminals to
unite behind cybercriminal activity,
and a consequence of this will be that
the United States will remain an attractive target.
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